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Due to the public good character of protective measures against natural dis-
asters events, their allocation is very often in the realm of bureaucratic and
expert agencies. Based on the economic theory of bureaucracy the behavior of
a bureau providing the good ”protection against natural hazards”is analysed.
The existing model is extended by further institutional constraints account-
ing for societal controll mechanisms. The main proposition is that the allo-
cation of protective measures through natural-hazard-management-agencies
does also result in cost and allocative ineﬃciencies, however, the amount of
allocative ineﬃciencies is relatively higher as compared to a normal bureau.
This is mainly due to the potential of blame-shifting from politicians to bu-
reaucrats. The considerations made in this paper can help to design a more
eﬃcient institutional framework in societal natural hazard management.
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JEL classiﬁcation: D72, D73, D81, Q541 Introduction
Hurricane ”Katrina”in New Orleans, the earthquake in Kashmere in 2005 or
the Tsunami in South-East-Asia in 2004 are just a few examples that reveal
our society’s vulnerability against natural disasters. Up to a certain degree,
protection against natural hazards is possible. Structural measures such as
dykes or avalanche barriers physically reduce the impact of natural hazards.
Hazard-zone mapping identiﬁes areas that are potentially aﬀected by ﬂooding
or land-slides. Such maps can be used to prevent people from settling down
in hazard-prone areas or induce them to build safer houses. Early warning
systems in combination with proper information channels can identify up-
coming hazards and organizational measures such as evacuations can at least
reduce or prevent human losses (e.g. Tsunami warning system). Insurances
provide a possibility to transfer the ﬁnancial risks of extreme events and pro-
vide incentives for risk-adequate behaviour given that insurance premiums
reﬂect the natural hazard risk. Under the consideration that a) according
to research on the eﬀects of climate change an increase in the frequency of
extreme weather in the near future is likely (e.g. IPCC 2001) and b) public
funds in general and for natural hazard management in particular are lim-
ited, society needs an institituional framework and decision processes that
ensure the eﬃcient allocation of these limited funds.
Although a certain demand for the good ”protection against natural haz-
ards” exists, it is very often under- or sometimes oversupplied. The public
good characteristics of certain protective measures as well as imperfections on
the market for disaster insurance (e.g. Jaﬀee & Russell 2003) can be seen as
explanations for state intervention in this area. It can be observed that due
to the complexity and the riskiness of the task, decision-making power over
the allocation of these protective goods and services is very often delegated
from politicians to bureaucrats or expert agencies. Such a delegation could
provide the ground for ineﬃciencies due to principal-agent-problems and re-
sulting organizational slack and over-supply of protection against natural
hazards. This paper provides a positive analysis of the behavior of natural
1hazard management agencies (NHM-agencies) and makes suggestions for the
design of alternative societal decsion mechanisms.
Section 2 provides a short introduction to the economic theory of bureau-
cracy and an overview of the relevant literature. In section 3, this theory is
enlarged by a focus on agencies responsible for the provision of the good ”pro-
tection against natural hazards”. Based on this, a formal model is developed
in section 4, comparing the behavior of a normal agency and a NHM-agency.
Section 5 presents concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.
2 Discretionary behavior of bureaus
The economic theory of bureaucracy goes back to the work by Cyert & March
(1963), who describes the phenomenon of organizational slack as rents that
are generated through discretion by managers of a ﬁrm. Niskanen (1971),
Migu´ e & B´ elanger (1974) and Breton & Wintrobe (1975) applied this idea to
bureaus. Beside the task to provide the public good or service an agency was
created for, bureaucrats have certain freedom to acquire rents in the form
of discretionary proﬁts. These undesired expenses could include additional
equipment, employees or the discretion to award supplier contracts to com-
panies with the best informal relations rather than the company with the
most competitive oﬀer. In particular, the propositions made by Niskanen’s
modell have been applied empirically by various scholars (e.g. Grosskopf &
Hayes 1993, Ott 1980). An econometric study by Kress (1989) with data
on Colleges in California, conﬁrmed Niskanen’s hypothesis that bureaucrats
maximize both formal and informal output. However, the author did not
ﬁnd any evidence that the bureaus tend to oversupply their service.
According to Migu´ e & B´ elanger (1974) bureaucrats will choose that point
on their budget line where the marginal rate of substitution between formal
output and other expenses equals the slope of their budget line. In opposition
to the conclusions by Niskanen (1971) the bureaucrat will produce a level of
output somewhere between proﬁt maximization and output maximization.
This means that if the bureaucrats receive any utility from other expenses,
they will not produce maximum output. The authors further conclude that
2the ineﬃciency of bureaus does not necessarily stem from oversupply, but
from bureaucrats enjoying discretionary power. Duizendstraal & Nentjes
(1994a) add two points of critique to Migu´ e & B´ elanger (1974)’s model.
Firstly, the conclusion that an increase in demand for the public service will
increase the relative expenses does not hold under the assumption made in
the model. Secondly, Migu´ e & B´ elanger (1974) did not make assumptions
concerning the institutional framework the bureau is embedded in. In a fur-
ther paper Duizendstraal & Nentjes (1994b) incorporated this second point of
critique in their model of non-proﬁt organisations by analysing the manager’s
behavior under four diﬀerent subsidy regimes. In the following section the
focus shifts from the general model of bureaus and non-proﬁt-organizations
on the the particular case of NHM-agencies.
3 Natural Hazard Management Agencies
Agencies or bureaus responsible for the provision of the good and service
protection against natural-hazards (e.g. the FEMA and the US Army Corps
of Engineers in the U.S., the BUWAL in Switzerland or the WLV in Austria)
feature similar characteristics as the standard model bureau. The notation
”formal output” and ”informal output” by Duizendstraal & Nentjes (1994b)
also apply to NHM-agencies. The formal output is basically the good or
service ”protection against natural hazards” e.g. dykes, hazard zone maps
or the distribution of information, where informal output includes additional
staﬀ or equipment. Certain NHM-tasks clearly demand experts and their-
knowledge e.g. identiﬁcation of hazardous areas, estimates on the occurence
probability, as such tasks that can hardly be accomplished by politicians or
citizens. However, this paper is concerned with allocation of goods and ser-
vices through an agency (instead of politicians or directly by citizens) that
goes beyond the sole provision of this information. The goods and services
of interest are constrained to protective measures with a medium to long
run perspective such as structural measures (e.g. constructions or protec-
tive forests), organizational measures (e.g. zoning and building codes) and
adaptive strategies. Short term adaption instruments(e.g. road blocks, tem-
3porary evacuation) or risk transfer mechanism (e.g. ad-hoc ﬁnancial relief,
catastrophe funds) are cancelled out in this analysis.
Numerous scholars have already applied public-choice theory of bureaus
on NHM-agencies. For example Shughart II (2006) points out that the US
Army Corps of Engineers, responsible for the construction and maintenance
of protective measures of various kinds, ”[...] is famous for pork barrel and
cost overruns (p. 40)”. Beside discretionary behaviour bureaus dealing with
low-probability-high-loss-events in general and NHM-agencies in particular
show ver distinct features from a public-choice perspective. Sobel & Leeson
(2006) deﬁne two types of errors of public bureaus responsible for risky tasks
that can lead to an ineﬃcient provision of public goods and services: Type-
one-errors occur if agencies are too under-cautious. For example a NHM-
agency fails to build a protective barrier or maintain an existing one that
might have saved a village from an avalanche. If a type-one error occurs and
becomes visible to the media and the public the consequences for the respon-
sible agency can be severe. In connection with the ﬂood disaster following
hurricane ”Katrina” Shughart II (2006) points out that bureaucrats seemed
to have neglected less visible infrastructure projects and maintenance work
on existing infrastructure. The public outrage about sluggish maintenance
of existing levees was immense.
Type-two-errors result from an agency’s over-cautiousness. For example
Peltzman (1973) estimates that the negative eﬀects of not approved drugs by
the U.S. Food and Drug Association (FDA) (trying to avoid the risk deaths
by an approved but unsafe drug) outweigh the potential costs of ineﬀective
or risky drugs permitted.1 The problem is that ineﬃcencies from type-two
errors are less identiﬁable and visible. The installation of one additional
avalanche barriers on an already secured hazard prone slope will possibly
not be regarded as a waste of tax-money as ”... you can never know what
happens!”2. The reason why agencies might commit type-two-erros is basi-
cally that they do not want to be considered to commit a type-one-error.
1(Mueller 2003) gives a comprehensive overview of empirical studies on risk-avoiding
bureaucrats.
2Depending on the institutional design of the subsidy regime
4In other words, bureaucratic agencies have an incentive to be over-cautious
and provide too much of their service because they do not want to be made
responsible for disastrous events and the consequences for society.
In general, politicians tend to delegate the more unattractive but nec-
essary tasks to other institutions or bureaus and keep ”safer” tasks. For
example Vaubel (1986) used this ”dirty-work hypothesis”to explain interna-
tional relations. He argues that national politicians try to transfer these tasks
to international organisations (e.g. IMF) or supra-national political entities
(e.g. EU). This might also apply to policies involving low-probability-high-
loss events in general. Politicians shift the tasks related to natural hazard
management - which is necessary however unattractive regarding the poss-
sibility of catastrophes - and leave the risk of being punished by the public
(and the voters) for ”bad luck” to the bureaucrat. Through this process of
blame shifting the bureaucrat ends up as the scapegoat. The issue of shifting
blame for threatening events has so far only been rarely adressed in polit-
ical sciences and political economy and has received some attention within
psychology by Tennen & Aﬄeck (1990).
Basically there are two opposite considerations to blame-shifting: First,
more risky tasks are also linked to greater rents. Second, shifting blame of
unpopular but more eﬃcient (but hard to communicate within day-to-day-
politics or inﬂuenced by well-organized interest groups) tasks could also be
welfare improving. Regarding the issue of natural hazard events politicians
very often keep the post-event part of risk-management (e.g. federal compen-
sation of losses) under their control. An empirical analysis by Garrett & So-
bel (2003) on governmental assistance after natural catastrophes in the USA
shows that FEMA’s disaster expenditure is signiﬁcantly higher in election
years (around $140 million as compared to non-election years). They con-
clude that almost half of FEMA disaster payments are politically motivated.
Discretionary rubber boots politics3are highly visible and accountable and
therefore a preferable mean for politicians to gain votes. Schwarze & Wagner
3After natural catastrophes, politicians very often enter the disaster areas, wearing
rubber boots, and promising immediate and unbureaucratic ﬁnancial assistance to the
victims.
5(2004) analyse the eﬀects of the governmental ad-hoc assistance (”Schroeder-
rule”) after the ﬂooding in Germany 2002 and its eﬀect on federal election
results. On the opposite, unpopular preventive measures (e.g. structural
measures at rivers that have negative impacts on the river’s eco-system, the
extension of hazard zones) are very often transfered to bureaucrats. Stricter
building codes or road blocks are rather accounted to the agency responsible
for checking the compliance than to politicians who actually issued the law.
The possibility of becoming the scapegoat of last resort creates incentives
for the NHM-agencies to undertake actions that minimize this risk. The po-
tential risk of being subject to a public backlash accompanied by a loss in
prestige, funds or even the position can be seen as an institutional constraint
a NHM-agency faces. The work by Duizendstraal & Nentjes (1994a) already
pointed out the importance of this institutional constraints in the analysis of
bureaucratic behaviour. Hence, this paper now tries to extend the model of
Duizendstraal & Nentjes (1994b) by control mechanisms an agency faces.
4 The model
The purpose of this model is twofold: In the ﬁrst step the model by Duizend-
straal & Nentjes (1994b) will be extended by an institutional variable ac-
counting for a probable control through an auditing board, that might reveal
organizational slack. This analyses the behavior of an ”ordinary” agency or
non-proﬁt organization, for example an infrastructure agency that provides
street lighting.
In a second step, the model will be extended to analyse the behavior of a
NHM-agency. Here we can assume an agency responsible for natural hazard
management including hazard zone mapping and the installation of avalanche
and torrent barriers. Regarding the subsidy framework, the model assumes
a lump-sum regime. Infrastructure agencies in general, and NHM-agencies
in particular mainly act under a lump-sum subsidy regime.
64.1 The behavior of an ordinary agency
The agency’s utility function is given by:
U = U (x1,x2) (1)
where x1 accounts for the amount of formal infrastructure output, in our case
street lighting and x2 describes the amount of fringe beneﬁts, such as expen-
sive oﬃce equipment or the placing of the contract to ”related” companies
that deliver input factors at higher prices.
The agency’s cost function is
C = C1 (x1) + C2 (x2) + θ(Z (x2)). (2)
The term θ(Z (x2)) reﬂects the institutional constraint of an auditing
processes that the agency might be subject to, with Z′
x2 < 0, Z′′
x2 = 0 and
0 < θ < 1. Depending on the general institutional design, such an audit takes
place in a constant manner e.g. yearly or by random testing. Depending on
the design, the θ can be considered as the probability that the auditing
court reveals the extend of the organizational slack within the agency or the
probability that a random auditing, with the certain outcome that slack is
revealed, takes place. In comparison to the work by Banks (1989) and Banks
& Weingast (1992) the control technology and thus the auditing costs are
assumed to be ﬁxed. Z (x2) describes the extent of disciplinary measures
depending on the amount of organizational slack. This could be for example
the introduction of more formalized control measures resulting in a loss of
discretionary freedom and additional work or even the lay-oﬀ of employees
or the management.
The total revenue R from charges for x1 is
R = p(x1) × x1, (3)
where p′ < 0 and R′ < 0.
The agency maximizes its utility (1) under the constraint
7S + R = C1 + C2 + θ(Z2), (4)
and under the constraints (2), (3). S accounts for the lump sum subsidy
from the government. Under these constraints the agency’s budget constraint
is
x2 =
S + R − C1
c2 + θ(z2)
, (5)
where c2 and θ(z2) account for the average costs of informal expenses de-
scribed by the average cost of x2 and the average expected costs of a potential
audit z2. The agency’s budget constraint is represented by function El in ﬁg-
ure 1. The infrastructure agency’s budget constraint is set in comparison to
the budget constraint derived by Duizendstraal & Nentjes (1994b), E. In
their model the agency’s indiﬀerence curve touches the budget constraint at
point A and an amount x1 of the formal output and an amount x2 of other
discretionary output are made. The obvious eﬀect of the introduction of the
term θ(z2) is an increase in the costs for other discretionary output relatively
to formal output and a substitution eﬀect towards more formal output. The
infrastructure agency in this model, thus produces at point B an amount xl
1
of street lighting and xl
2 of other discretionary output.
The Lagrangian function for the normal agency’s problem is:
L(x1,x2) = U (x1,x2)
+ λ[S + R(x1) − (C1 (x1) + C2 (x2) + θ(Z (x2)))]
(6)
The ﬁrst order conditions are:
Ux1 + λ[Rx1 − C
′
1] = 0 (7)
Ux2 + λ[−(C
′
2 + θ(Zx2))] = 0 (8)
8Combining (7) and (8) results in the marginal rate of substitution between










4.2 The behavior of a NHM-agency
The NHM-agency faces the same utility function (1) as the normal agency.
However, here x1 describes the amount of protective measures e.g. hazard
zone maps in municipalities, avalanche barriers or surveillance activities. The
NHM-agency faces the following revenue function:
Rn = pn (x1) × x1 − π(x1) × m. (10)
The agency again receives a revenue p(x1) × x1 from selling protective
measures. In contrast to a normal infrastructure agency, its revenue also
depends on the occurence of an LPHL event. After e.g. a natural disas-
ter took place the aﬀected citizens and, depending on the media coverage,
the public as a whole make politicians at least partially responsible for this
event. Due to the delegation of the task, the politicians have now the option
to shift a certain amount or all of the blame to the agency. The likelihood
that an amount of blame and related negative consequences, m, are shifted
to the agency is π, where 0 < π < 1. At this stage we assume that x1 ac-
counts for protective measures that inﬂuence the occurence probability of a
LPHL-event, e.g. certain structural measures (avalanche barriers located at
the potential incipient crack of an avalanche or surveillance activities). The
agency can thus inﬂuence the expected amount of blame-shifting through the
provision of formal output x1. Therefore, the bureaucrats incorporate this
blame-game-premium in their revenue function in order to insure themselves
against negative consequences. In addition we assume that m is a constant
reﬂecting e.g. a liability process. Looking at ﬂood hazards as an example:
Given limited public ﬁnances and thus a limited budget for the NHM agency,
the bureaucrats can only install dykes and other protective measures in some
areas (and thereby reducing π), while other places are put on hold. If a ﬂood
9hits an unprotected area the number of protected places does not really mat-
ter, citizens and politicians will make the agency liable. This assumtption
further accounts for the observation that, at least in the area of natural haz-
ard management, agencies very often prefer visible (and budget-intensive)
structural measures , that reduce the occurence probability rather than less
visible (and very often less budget-intensive) measures (e.g. zoning, temporal
evacuation or road blocks or the advice the purchase of an insurance).
For equation 10 we assume that Rn = R, showing that an LPHL-agency
faces the same total amount of revenue. However, as π′ < 0 the marginal
revenue between a normal agency and an LPHL-agency diﬀers, R′ < R′
n.
This revenue function ﬂattens the NHM-agency’s budget constraint and, af-
ter repeating the maximization steps, also changes the marginal rate of sub-
stitution. The graphical interpretation of the model again is represented in
ﬁgure 1. En is the LPHL-agency’s budget constraint. Due to the assump-
tion of potential blame shifting, a further substitution eﬀect towards formal
output, protection against natural-hazards, takes place. The NHM-agency
produces at point C an amount xn
1 of formal output and an amount of xn
2 of
informal output.
Proposition 1 An agency or bureau responsible for the provision of the good
”protection against natural-hazards”produces relatively higher allocative inef-
ﬁciencies (x1), but relatively lower cost ineﬃciencies (x2) as a normal bureau.
4.3 Changes in demand, budget and responsibility
After natural disasters occurred individuals are more sensibilised politicians
tend to provide bureaucrats with additional funds and responsibilities. Kah-
neman, Slovic & Tversky (1982) described this pheonmenom as ”availability
bias”. Individuals tend to put relative greater attention to certain risks that
actually feature a rather low probability of occurrence, but have a bigger
psychological (e.g. higher media-attention) and/or physical (e.g. a disaster
happened within the region the individual lives in) presence. First, it is as-


















Figure 1: Budget and Output
11p∗′ < p′ and second, that the government is increasing the lump-sum subsidy
for the agency, S∗ > S. The increase in demand has eﬀects on the p(x1)×x1
part of the agency’s revenue function, but no eﬀects on the π (m(x1)) part,
the expected penalty from blame shifting. This leads to an increase in both
cost and allocative ineﬃciencies. Depending on the relative increase of lump-
sum subsidy, the allocative and the cost eﬃciencies might increase at the
same level. An overreaction by the government and a relatively high in-
crease of subsidies, could also result in a relatively higher increase of the
cost-ineﬃciencies.
However, the shift of additional funds is very often related to the del-
egation of additional responsibilities and thus, a higher load of blame to
be loaded on the agency if something bad happens. This would mean that
the agency’s blame-game premium would not only depend on the amount of
protective measures installed, but also on the amount of subsidies received,
π (m(x1,S)). The agency’s budget constraint is now ﬂatter and the income
eﬀect would again increase both, cost and allocative ineﬃciencies, but the
increase of allocative ineﬃciencies is relatively higher.
Proposition 2 An increase in lump-sum subsidies by the government and
increased demand for protective measures, combined with an additional shift
of responsibilities leads to a relatively higher increase of allocative ineﬃcien-
cies (ceteris paribus).
If the NHM-agency observes an increase in the frequency of natural dis-
asters (e.g. a rise in extreme weather events through climate change) the
probability π will also rise. Keeping the demand and lump-sum subsidy
constant, allocative ineﬃciency will also increase.
Proposition 3 An increase in the frequency of natural hazards results in
additional allocative ineﬃciencies in the provision of protective measures by
NHM-agencies (ceteris paribus).
124.4 Results and implications
The results of this model show the eﬀects of changes in the institutional
environment on bureaus or agencies and in particular of an agency provid-
ing protection against low-probability-high-loss-events such as natural disas-
ters. The introduction of an institutional variable accounting for a potential
penalty related to the extend of organizational slack (Z (x2)) triggers a sub-
stitutional as well as an income eﬀect and increases the production of formal
output x1.
The results of the model suggest that in comparison to a normal agency,
NHM-agencies tend to produce relatively more formal output and thus, in-
duce relatively higher allocative ineﬃciencies on society. This might be due
to the issue, that NHM-agencies are more likely to become the subject of
blame-shifting from politicians. Another issue is related to a change in the
occurrence probability of natural disasters or potential penalty.
In most economies the majority of protective goods and services are
sovereign duty as they impact individual liberties. Up to a certain amount
(even higher than the amount demanded by society) ”protection against nat-
ural hazards” may cause similar allocative ineﬃciencies than high amounts
of other infrastructure. After the installation of protective measures has
reached a certain threshold, additional costs on society could arise, mainly
induced by the limitations of individual liberties (e.g. hazard zones decrease
areas available for settlement). The question that arises is how to reduce the
cost and in particular the allocative ineﬃciencies. Basically, the public and
politicians demand the expert knowledge of the agency. Therefore it might
be necessary to limit the responsibilities of the agency to the provision of
expert information about the frequency and spatial appearance of natural
disasters. Then a number of alternative decision mechanisms could result in
a more eﬃcient allocation of protective measures:
First, the actual provision of protective measures could then be dele-
gated to competitive administrative units (e.g. FOCJ for natural hazard
management)(Frey & Eichenberger 1999). Second, another possibility is to
put the decision on the allocation of protective measures into the hands of
13the citizens via e.g. referenda. Third, participative methods could induce
more transparency. Fourth, the allocation of protective measures could be
regulated by an alternative allocation mechanism, such as a voucher sys-
tem (Raschky 2005). Again it should be mentioned that, these alternative
decision processes should be applied to natural hazard management with a
medium to long term horizon (e.g. hazard zone mapping, technical measures,
permanent evacuation) rather than short term strategies (e.g. temporary
evacuation, roadblock) and catastrophe management.
5 Conclusion & Suggestions
This paper analyses the behavior of natural-hazard-management agencies
and proposes that the provision of protective measures through bureaus re-
sults in relative higher ineﬃcient oversupply than ordinary bureaus and that
additional governmental funds and responsibilities for the agency might in-
crease these allocative ineﬃciencies even at a bigger extend. The explanation
for such a development is the phenomenon of blame-shifting from politicians
to bureaus. Possible alternative decision mechanisms that could reduce these
ineﬃciencies are presented as well. Given the hypotheses formulated in this
paper a number of extensions are still necessary. Based on the analysis of
liability processes, one can receive more detailed information about NHM-
agencies’ ”blame-game premium”. Such an analysis can then be used to anal-
yse whether the ”riskiness” of a task really aﬀects the chances to be blamed
for unwanted outcomes.
Another interesting question that arises is of normative nature: Which
are the optimal societal decision mechanisms for the allocation of the good
”protection against natural hazards”? Further analysis needs to be done con-
cerning the issue how members of society will decide upon decision mecha-
nisms for protection against LPHL-events at the constitutional table (behind
a veil of ignorance).
A normative analysis of societal decision mechanisms could be of partic-
ular interest regarding the aspect of blame-shifting. The transfer of decision
power for the allocation of the good ”protection against LPHL-events” to a
14direct democratic process would also shift the responsibility to the voters.
This would mean that if the peoples’ decision was ”wrong”(e.g. a ﬂood dam-
aged an unprotected area) there is no political or bureaucratic identity that
can be made responsible for. According to the propositions made in a recent
paper by Buchanan (2005), ”people are afraid to be free”. He suggests, that
individuals transfer tasks to others (or the state) in order to deny personal
responsibilities. Taking this thought into account, a normative analysis of
the optimal decision mechanism for the allocation of protection that would
be chosen behind a veil of ignorance would be very fruitful.
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Due to the public good character of protective measures against natural disasters 
events, their allocation is very often in the realm of bureaucratic and expert agencies. 
Based on the economic theory of bureaucracy the behaviour of a bureau providing 
the good "protection against natural hazards" is analysed. The existing model is 
extended by further institutional constraints accounting for societal control 
mechanisms. The main proposition is that the allocation of protective measures 
through natural-hazard-management-agencies does also result in cost and allocative 
inefficiencies, however, the amount of allocative inefficiencies is relatively higher as 
compared to a normal bureau. This is mainly due to the potential of blame-shifting 
from politicians to bureaucrats. The considerations made in this paper can help to 
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